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RUNNING TO THE EXTREMES: EVALUATING THE POLARIZATION
OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CONTESTS
Robert Steinbuch*
The conventional electoral wisdom took the assumption of a centrally-
meaned, singular mode distribution of voters and suggested that candidates
should campaign to the poles in primary elections to appeal to the politically
left or right of center electorate in their parties; then, once the candidates
win their primaries, they should moderate their positions to appeal to the
majority of the voters in the political center. Such an approach was em-
ployed with success. This paradigm, however, appears to be changing. Re-
cently, various candidates have been selectively appealing to the political
boundaries in general elections, rather than moving to the median on voters-
preferences. These candidates have come to recognize that while their base
voters are more likely to vote for them than for candidates from the other
party, these voters are less likely to vote at all if they see the candidates
from their party only slightly more in tune with their views than the candi-
dates from the opposite party.' Thus, candidates employing the New-model
("New-model") have become more polarized than we would have expected
employing the conventional model.
New-model candidates, however, understand that they need to be care-
ful in choosing which anchor issues to adopt so that their appeal to their
bases does not directly reduce gains achieved by persuading centrist swing
voters. The key to this approach appears to be the adoption of anchor issues
that do not directly impact the centrally-meaned electorate. And, this is
achieved by choosing intensity issues; that is, candidates anchor to their
bases on issues about which their bases feel far more passionately than the
general population.
This phenomenon is best seen recently with the issue of gay marriage.
A recent CBS poll described that Americans are fairly split on their support
or opposition to a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, with
slightly more in this poll supporting the Amendment.2 However, while three
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bo-
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1. But see, Sunshine Hillygus & Todd Shields, Moral Issues and Voter Decision Mak-
ing in the 2004 Presidential Election, POL. SC. & POL., Apr. 2005, at 201, 207, available at
http://www.apsa.com/imgtest/PSAprO5HillygusShields.pdf.
2. Poll. Most Oppose Gay Weddings, CBS NEWS, Feb. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/24/national/main601828.shtml.
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quarters of proponents of gay marriage would, nonetheless, vote for a candi-
date who opposes gay marriage, over half of those who oppose gay marriage
would never vote for a candidate who differs with them on this valence is-
sue.3 Accordingly, candidates opposing gay marriage could drive up friendly
voters in a general election by campaigning to the right without significantly
diminishing their appeal to independent swing voters.4 Indeed, many have
suggested that ballot measures on partisan issues, such as the many meas-
ures on gay marriage that have traversed the recent electoral landscape, of-
ten enhance voter turnout in general elections for candidates supporting
those issues, with little negative effect on swing voters.5 The result is greater
partisan campaigning, as the electoral benefits are tangible and the corres-
ponding costs are negligible.
3. Id. The Pew Research Institute has developed the same findings. Gay Marriage a
Voting Issue, but Mostly for Opponents, PEW RES. CTR., Feb. 27, 2004, available at
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=204 [hereinafter PEW REs.] ("For the
most part, gay marriage is a make-or-break voting issue only to the opponents of that idea;
supporters of gay marriage generally say a candidates stance would not affect their [sic]
vote.").
4. Interestingly, the disconnect between intensity and position is not similarly seen on
other traditional valence issues such as abortion and gun control. PEW RES., supra note 3
("About one-in-five voters (19%) say they would not vote for a candidate who disagrees with
their position in support of continued access to abortion; 15% say they would not vote for a
candidate who takes the opposite view .... Roughly three-in-ten Republicans (29%) say they
would not vote for a candidate who believes it is more important to control gun ownership
than protect the rights of gun owners. A sizable minority of men also take that position
(25%). While the vast majority of Democratic voters (68%) believe it is more important to
control gun ownership than protect the right of Americans to own guns, relatively few Demo-
crats (19%) say they would not vote for a candidate who disagrees with them on this issue.
Fully 44% of Democrats say they would vote for a candidate even if they differed with him
or her on that particular issue.").
5. David E. Campbell & J. Quin Monson, The Religion Card: Gay Marriage and the
2004 Presidential Election, at 6 (2005), available at
http://www.nd.edu/-dcampbe4/RELIGION%20CARD.pdf ("the gay marriage ban also ap-
pears to have boosted turnout among Bush supporters"); Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Turnout.png (indicating that voter turnout in the 2004
presidential election was at its highest since 1966, with a notable spike during the 1992 presi-
dential election); but see Daniel A. Smith, Was Rove Right? The Partisan Wedge and Tur-
nout Effects of Issue 1: Ohio's 2004 Ballot Initiative to Ban Gay Marriage, at 7, 13, 21-22
(2005), available at
http://law.usc.edu/academics/centers/cslp/conferences/direct -democracy-05/documents/smit
h.pdf. ("Cognizant of the potential mobilizing effects of ballot measures, parties have tried to
use ballot measures to activate their base supporters on Election Day .... Democrats, such as
California Senator Dianne Feinstein concurred, saying that the gay marriage measures 'did
energize a very conservative vote,' as 'it gave them a position to rally around."' However, the
author concludes that while the presence of the anti-gay marriage amendment on the ballot
did have a positive effect on support for President Bush in the 2004 election, the percent of
turnout was not affected by the level of support for the measure.).
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Augmenting this effect is the fact that the proportion of independent
voters has decreased; the 2004 Presidential election showed a very high lev-
el of party-line voting.6 As a result, the appeal to swing voters becomes less
relevant as their proportion of the total voting pool diminishes. The end re-
sult is that driving up partisan voter turnout becomes more important than
persuading independent voters-i.e., the New-model becomes the control-
ling strategy.
The polarizing effect of this new paradigm of electoral politics is likely
to result in a concomitant enactment of legislation that passionately appeals
to a relative minority, while only moderately appealing to a majority-
forming portion of the population. The question is whether this is how we
want to enact legislation. James Madison addressed this very issue in The
Federalist Papers:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens ... who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to
the rights of other citizens .... As long as the reason of man continues
fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be
formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his
self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence
on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will
attach themselves .... The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the
nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different
degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil
society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning
government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice;
an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-
eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided
mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to
co-operate for their common good .... When a majority is included in a
faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the
rights of other citizens.
7
Madison's solution to this conundrum was the development of the
republican form of government: "The influence of factious leaders may
kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a
6. Hillygus & Shields, supra note 1, at 202, 204 (2005); see also Election Results,
CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/UIS/H/OO/epolls.O.html.




general conflagration through the other States."8 The problem is that
Madison's approach seems premised on the old paradigm. The New-model
may subvert the Federalist's solution. Under the New-model, the intensity of
minority factions may overwhelm the relative indifference of larger groups.9
This phenomenon is seen in modem-day pork-barrel legislation."0 Thus, now
we often see legislation, rather than appealing to a majority as a whole, is
composed of many small components each appealing to a small group.
The New-model suggests that we will need to continue to think about
how we envision the role of factions in the creation of legislation. Do we
want government to be limited to what is strongly preferred by most, with
the accompanying republican checks on democratic tyranny? Or, are we
comfortable with a system that distributes legislative benefits to smaller
groups with the hopes that in the end the distribution will be, by chance or
design, equitable?
8. Id. at 48.
9. In fact, minority factions can and do combine to create apparent majorities wherein
coalition factions agree to support each other's proposals. The result is that member factions
achieve there policy preferences under the guise of majority support.
10. One political science scholar well defines pork-barrel legislation as follows:
Appropriations of public funds by Congress (or other legislative assemblies) for
projects that do serve the interests of any large portion of the country's citizenry
but are nevertheless vigorously promoted by a small group of legislators because
they will pump outside taxpayers' money and resources into local districts these
legislators represent. Successful promotion of such pork barrel legislation (often
through skillful logrolling) is very likely to get the legislator re-elected by his
constituents. Classic examples of such pork[-barrel legislation include Federal
appropriations bills for dams, river and harbor improvements, bridge and high-
way construction, and job-training centers, as well as legislation designed to pre-
vent closure of obsolete or unneeded military institutions, prisons, VA hospitals
and the like.
Paul M. Johnson, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms,
http://www.auburn.edu/-johnson/gloss/. Logrolling, in turn, is a "practice common in the
[United States] Congress and in many other legislative assemblies in which two (or more)
legislators agree for each to trade his vote on one bill he cares little about in exchange for the
other's vote on a bill that is personally much more important to him." Id.
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